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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
WILLIAM N. CHRISTIANSEN,
)
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Vi-:.

VINCENT L. REES, DOE I and DOE II,
and THE SALT LAKE CLINIC, a Pro- ,
fessional Corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

CASE
NO. 10731

1

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a malpractice action for compensatory damages against a medical doctor and others who may be liable,
for negligently causing the broken end of a surgical needle
to be left in the Appellant's body during a medical operation.

DISPOSITION IN WWER COURT
At pretrial upon the Defendants' motion, the Court
dismissed the action with prejudice on the ground that it
was barred by the Statute of Limitations.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant seeks a decision setting aside the judgment of the trial court and remanding the case to the lower
court for trial on the merits.
S1'A'i'ElWENT OF FACTS

About September 1950, the Appellant began seeing Dr.
Floyd Cannon, a partner in the Salt Lake Clinic, for treatment of a diarrhetic condition (Christensen, Depos., pp. 8
& 9). Dr. Rees, another partner in the Clinic (now a p:rofusffional corporation), first saw the Appellant in August
1951, in connection with a minor hemorrhoid operation
which he performed. In February 1952, Dr. Rees also removed the Appellant's ileum, and in December of the same
year he performed a total colectomy. Finally, on .Aipril
12, 1955, he removed the Appellant's anus (Christiansen
Depos., pp. 9-11). Following a final ~amination by Dr.
Rees, which was made upon the patient's release from tile
hospital the Appellant returned to Mayfield, Utah, where
he was placed under the care of a local doctor and was not
treated again by the Resix>ndents.
Subsequent to the operation af 1955, the patient had
become extremely nervous and irritable, experiencing pain
in his lower body, chills, impotency and other symptoms.
At the time of his release from the hospital, the Appellant
had asked Dr. Rees about these symptoms and was told
that "time will heal it." (Christiansen Deposition, pp. 21
and 47). After returning to southern Utah, the Appellant
continued to complain from time to time to his family doctor, who repeatedly reassured the Appellant that the discomfort was normal and that the symptoms would grad-
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ually disappear in time (Christiansen rDeposition, pp. 19,
21 and 43), but the condition did not improve and the Appellant eventually began consulting Dr. Stewart, of Gunni..;on. who, in 1962, referred the patient to Dr. Endsley, a
physician in Provo, in the belief that the Appellant was
suifein!-~ from kidney stones.
On the subject of Appellant's
meclical history, Dr. Endsley reports the following:
"This patient is seen for evaluation of the problem of
recurrent leH flank pain, chills, fever, and pyuria of apprnxirnately 6 years duration. This patient has had a
three stage collectomy for ulcerative colitis with an
ileostomy in 1955. Since the collectomy was begun
the patient has had recurrent left flank and lower
guadrant pain with recurrent pyuria, chills and fever.

"

Dr. Endsl<e>y, who is a specialist, was unable to discowr the sow·ce of the pain, despite an extensive physical
examination, until X-rays revealed the presence of a foreign object in the Appellant's body on July 14, 1962. The
rarliologist who took the X-Rays, Dr. James Matheson of
the Utah Valley L.D.S. Hospital, made the following diagnostic conclusions, which he furnished to Dr. Endsley:

"Impression: 1.

No lesion is seen in the intravenous
pyelogram to the extent of visualization.

2.

The spleen appears slightly enlarged.

NOTE:

There is a curvolinear metalic-like density
just above the synphgals pubis which has
the X-ray appearance of a broken surgical
needle."
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Later the same day, in which the
were made, Dr. Endsley performed an
tion without any substantial finding.
sent the patient to Dr. Matheson again
which were taken on August 7, 1962.
port reads as follows:

X-ray photographs
exploratory operaDr. Endsley then
for further X-rays,
Dr. Matheson's re-

"AP & Lateral Views of the Pelvis.
The curvolinear metallic density thought to be a portion of a surgical needle is seen in the soft tiS9Ue just
below the coccyx and slightly posterior. It lies almost
in the midline just barely to the right. The lower
two segments of the coocyx are not visible and this
may be due to surgical removal."
Subsequent to that report, Dr. Endsley performed a
second operation in which he attempted to locate the needle
in the bladder. As his post-operative comment in the hospital record shorws, however, he was unsuccessful.
The appellant's first knowledge that there was a needle
in his body and that it had been left there during the operative procedure performed by the Respondent, <Dr. Rees,
was the statement of Dr. Endsley to the Appellant that a
surgical needle had been left in his body, apparently from
the operation performed by Dr. Rees. This information
was conveyed to the Appellant between July 16, 1962, and
August 4, 1962.
It was stipulated by counsel for the Respondent at pretrial that, for purposes of the motion for summary judgment, the following facts were to he taken as true:
(1) That the needle in Mr. Christiansen's back was
a surgical needle;
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(2) That it was left there during and a result of the
Jc.st operation performed by the Respondent on Mr. Christiansen on or about April 12, 1955; and
(3)
That no other operations had been performed
@
that portion of the Appellant's body until the needle was
foLmd in 1962.
Even though Dr. Endsley felt that it was advisable to
retm,vc the needle and made an effort to do so, the needle
1\-a.s r;ot where he thought it was and the exploratory operaCon, conocquently, proved to be unsuccessful. There has
lkcil no subsquent attempt to extract the needle and it has
JCmained in the Appellant's body at the location dia~~rzuned by Dr. Matheson until the present date.

ARGUMENT
TIIE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING TIIE
RES?ONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON THE GROUND THAT THE ACTION WAS BARRED
UNDER UTAH LAW BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Traditionally, the justification given by the courts in
applying the harsh and often inequitable laws limiting the

period in which an action may be brought has been a fear
that injustice might result if an end coruld not be made,
sometime, to the possibility of litigation. As a consequence
of this fear, an arbitrary, but useful point has been chosen
by the Legislature at four years from the time at Which
the period began to run.
Unfortunately, it has never been clear, as evidenced by
the myriad interpretations all over the country, at just
what point the statute begins to run. While the Appellant
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Ii

accepts, reluctantly, the obvious utility of providing some
cutoff point for litigation, it does not appear to the Appellant that Utah law requires that po~nt to be the one ohosen
by the trial court in the case at hand. Indeed, in view of
the liberal trend in this area, it woold seem that a total
consideration of the problem requires an entirely different
conclusion: that the statute of limitations should be interpreted to run, in malpractice actions, from the date of discovery by the Plaintiff, not from the date of the negligent
act.
It appears

to the Appellant that the only important

issue before the Court is the proper construction to be
placed on the applicable statute of limitation, Title 78-1225, U.C.A., in the light of: (1) legislative pmpose, to the
degree that it can be ascertained; (2) national and Utah
case 1aw to the extent that actual holdings, as opposed to
obiter dicta, can be found; and ( 3) public policy arguments,
particularly where legislative purpose is unclear. The stat
ute reads as follows:

"78-12-25. Within four yars. - Within four years:
( 2) An actioo for relief not otherwise provided
for by law."
It may readily be seen that sub-section two, which is
the relevant portion of the statute, is a catch-all provision,
enacted, in all likelihood, without specific consideration by
the Legislature of when the period should begin to run in
malpractice actions. The only legislative purpose manifested by the wording is that of enacting a statute of limitations provision broad enougih to cover all types of actions
not previously dealt with specifically. It is thus highly
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probable that the Legislature never considered the special
problem before the Court in the instant case. The question, therefore, becomes: what would the Legislature have
done had it been presented with the specific problem of this
case; when does the Statute of Limitations begin to run in
a malpractice action, from the date of discovery by the injurc:d ut from the date of the negligent act?
It is the contention of the Appellant that the public
policy of the State insofar as it has been expressed by the
Legislature, supports the running of the statute from the
date of discovery. This public policy finds explicit enunciation in Title 78-12-26, U.C.A. dealing with injuries to real
and personal property, fraud or mistake, and liability under state statutes, and 78-12-27, U.C.A., covering actions
against corporate stockholders or directors. While other
sections, such as that dealing with limitation of contractual liability, may expressly name some other point of begining such as the point a:t which the last charge was made,
this is reasonably given the intrinsic differences between
contractual and tort liability and their differenres in terms
of ease of discovery of the wrong. It seems clear that had
limitations om malpractice liability been dealt with specifically by the Legislature, the protection given the plaintiff
in other areas would have been extended to cover malpractice actions.

A concrete illustration of this interpretation of legisative purpose is the case of Attorney General v. Pomeroy,
73 Utah 46, 72 P2d 1277, in which it was held that the statute began running at the date of discovery even though
the applicable section, 104-2-20 (1943 Code), made no mention of discovery. Significantly, the discovery principle
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was codified, even at that early date, by the related section
104-2-24. Since the court held that the period run from
discovery even though Section 20 was silent on the subject,
it is obvious that the omission of specific reference to discovery in Title 78-12-26. in no way implies a rejection of t11e
discovery principle by the Legislature especially given the
catch-all, generalized nature of the section.
It is the position of the Appellant that legislative intent, if it were able to express itself today, wauld be that

the period begins running at the date of discovery of the
negligent act by the plaintiff. This follows from a consideration of what must be recognized as a basic trend in the
law towards the liberal discovery principle. While it is recognized th'.l.t two lines of authority exist, successive reading of 74 ALR 1319, 144 ALR 212 and 80 ALR 2d 368 cannot fail to impress the reader with the existence of a widespread trend in the direction of the better reasoned and
more liberal rule. The most prominent of the discovery
principle jurisdictions is California, but, as shown by 80
ALR 2d 388, the discovery p1inciple has now been accepted in approximately half the cases in which it has been
considered , and the proportion following the discovery principle, as shown by the ' ALR 2d Later Case Service, . Vol. 5.
appears to be much greater. In addition to the jurisdictions listed in 80 ALR 2d 388, the following jurisdictions
have since either ~dopted the discovery rule om initial consideration or have reversed previous decisions in following
the discovery rule: Spath v. Morrow, 174 Neb. 38, 115 NW
2d 581; Stacey v. Pantane, 177 Neb. 694, 131 NW 2d 163:
Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A2d 277; Seitz v.
Jones, 370 P2d 300; Billings v. Sisters of Mercy, 86 Idaho
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lS5. :;89 P2d 224; Johnson v. Caldwell, 371 Mich. 368, 123
NW2d 785; Mosby v. Michael Reese Hospital, 49 Ill. App.
2cl :rn;, 199 NE 2d 633. It cannot be doubted that modem tribunals consider the discovery doctrine to be the betk1'. more equitable rule.
/,Jrhotcgh other case law may be cited, the entire case
of the Respondents really depends upon a favorable interpretation of two Utah cases, to-wit: Peteler v. Robinson,
81 Ut. 535, 17 P2d 244, and Passey v. Budge, 85 Ut. 37, 38
P2d 712. The Appellant respectfully states that the Utah
rnses cited above do not stand for the proposition for which
they were cited in the lower court; that the principle of the
s;atute of limitations in malpractice cases begins running
r;t '.he dilie of the negligent act rather than at the date of
tli~covcry by the plaintiff.
In the Peteler case, the physician performed a negligent opratioa to remove the plaintiff's tonsils and contin-

ued to treat the plaintiff until 1926. The actinn for the
n•sulting injury incurred by the operation of 1919 was not
commenced until 1927. The eight year lapse in time was
not viewed as an obstacle by the court, however, which reverS<'d and held for the plaintiff on the ground that the statute of limitations did not bar recovery where the conduct
of the physician was a continuing form of negligence. In
p 01ssing, however, the court made comments in the form of
obiter dicta, that would imply that had the doctor not continued to treat the patient, the statute of limitations might
have begun running when the operation was performed.
As mere dicta, the court's remarks in Peteler need
not concern us long. These remarks, however, are under:-;t andable in view of the early date of the case and the fact
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that in 1932 the clear majority of American decisions, unlike today, supported the court's comments_ Despite the
unfavorable dicta, however, the Peteler opinion is liberal
in tone and, in its day, represented a step in the liberal
trer:a.1 already mentioned.
The .dicta of Petele1· is also made mo1·e understandable
when viewed in the light of the special facts of that casr.
In Peteler, unlike the instant case, the patient's ailment
was tonsillitus and and the operation was merely a tonsillectomy. Certainly, the disease was common enough to
the layman's experience and the operation was minor
enough that the patient should have been alarmed when
he not only failed to improve after a few years, but got
lock-jaw, rceived injury to his vocal cords, heart and nervous systems, and suffered infection of both ears, which
ultimately resulted in loss of hearing. This might have
doomed the Plaintiff's case had not the doctrine of continuing treatment saved it.
In sharp contrast, the Appellant in the instant case
had little rason to suspect that his symptoms were due to
the Respondents' negligent act: The patient had recently
undergone a series of major, somewhat complicated operations, in the lower part of his body which neither he nor
the general public could be expected to understand; the
seriousness of the patient's original ailment was such that
he correctly expected a great deal m suffering in his lower
body. This was so unalarming that even his family doctor
and the many other physicians whom he subsequently
complained to, failed to see anything unusual about it and
told him not to worry (Christiansen Deposition, pp. 19, 21.
43 and 47. In fairness, can the Resporndent reaHy expect
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the Appellant to have recognized and called the Respondrnt's attention to his negligence when even the many
trained doctors to whom the Appellant complained of the
pain never suspected the cause until tJhe X-ray was taken'?
Mere knowldge of the pain was not enough. The Apµellant went to numerous doctors in a vain attempt to elimiriate the pain and other symptoms. He cannot realistic,,IJy be expected to have returned to Dr. Rees (continuing
treatment doctrine) unless he had some reason to suspect
first, that the pain 'and other symptoms were caused by
L11e Respondent's operation and, second, that the operation
had tortiously or wrongfully caused him injury.
Nor can it be claimed that the Appellanit did not tcy
to find out the cause of the pain. The record shows that
he went to numerous (at least 4) doctors after the operation und he asked them, frequently, about the problem.
(Christiansen Deposition, pp. 22 and 23). The reason he
did not suspect the cause of his troubles was that he was
repeatedly reassured by his physicians that the sympt.oms
would eventually go away and that they were normal or
due to some other problem suclh a:s gall bladder trouble.
Quite naturally, he believed what his doctors told him; yet
he remained sufficiently alarmed to go to four different
doctors before the needle was discovered.
The second and most important case to Respondent's
position is Passey v. Budge, 85 Utah 37, 38 P2d 712. Jn
this case the defendant removed the plaintiff's toosils but
in doing so caused a portion of the scalpel blade to break.
The blade fell down the plaintiff's throat and the defendant failed to remove the broken piece of steel. This operation took place on May 13, 1925. From that time on the
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plaintiff went to the defendant for treatment until .June
17, 1930. Subsequent to that date she discovered the prrscr r.c of the broken blade in her body and it was removed
on January 6, 1932. The actiorn was commenced thereafter and the defendant claims that it was barred by thP
Statu1e of Limitations. The Court in this instance relied
upe>n the Petcler case; thus the cited cases of the defcnclcint did not apply. The case, by the same dicta, indicated
t~;at peThaps a different rule would apply had the action
been commenced more than three years after the alleged
negligernt operation.
We respectfully submit that the two Utah cases cited
by the Defendant are merely obiter dicta so far as this particular issue is concerned and that Utah has not considered
a case such as the instant case. There is no Utah rule;
consequently, one has to look to other primary authority
to determine the law.
There are two lines of authority concerning the sanw
question. So far as the Appellant can determine they are
about equally divided.
We believe that the Utah Court has consistently followed the California decisions and that California is the
prime source of authority for Utah cases where the Utah
Court it.self has not decided. Under the circumstances, it
is merely a question of which line of authority this Court
\vants to follow. We respectfully submit that the best line
of authority is the one that renders substantial justice anrl
does not bar a person from bringing an action for a con·
dition caused by the negligent conduct of another when tfue
circumsrt:ances of the other persons' negligence were unknown to the plaintiff and could not be kn{)IW!l to the plain·
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tiff by reason of ordinary care.

We respectfully submit
that the purpose of law is to render justice between the
parties and that any other rule which would prevent a person from seeking his remedy within a reasonable time after
the cause of injury is known, is a bad doctrine and not consistent with justice and is inconsistent with the newer and
better reasoned rule. The rule as stated by the California
Court is as follows:
"That where a foreign substance is negligently le£t in
a patient's body by a physician, surgeon, or dentist and
the patient is ignorant of the fact, and consequently
of his right of action for malpractice, the limitation
pe2·iod does not begin to run against a malpractice
action until the patient learns or, in the exercise of
reasonable care and diligence, should have learned of
the presence of such foreign substance in his body."
Huysman v. Korsch (1936) 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P(2d)
908.
Ehlen v. Burrows (1942) 51 Cal. 2nd 141, 124 P (2d)
82.
Pellett v. Sonstone Corp. (1942) 55 Cal. App. 2d 196,
130 p (2d) 181.
The case of Agnew v. Larson, a 1947 California case,
cited at 185 P2d 851, digests some of the earlier decisions
on the question. In the Agnew case the defendant contended that the rule applied in California cases identical to
the instant case was not applicable to the Agnew case for
reason that this was the prescribing of medicine ratlher
than the performance of a negligent operation. In the
Agnew case the Judge said, after analyzing the sw-gery
;·qses, the following:
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"Defendant, while conceding the applicability of the
foregoing rule to cases arising out of surgery, in which
the patient subsequently discovers foreign substances
such as sponges, clamps, tubes pieces of broken bones
and other obects to have been left in his body, contends that it does not apply to the administration or
introduction into the patient's body of a drug or medicine. We fail to find any basis of differentiation, however, in the respective situations."
The Com t went on to hold, therefore, in the Agnew
case, that the Statute of Limitations did not run until discovery of the condition.
In a case entited Faith v. Earhart, 52 Cal. App. 2d 228.
126 P2d 151, the Court denied the defendant's plea in bar
of th2 Statute of Limitations in a situation where a dentist
had failed to remove broken bones or the roots of teeth.
after maldng extractions and notwithstanding the fact that
the plaintiff did not discover the dentist's error for ten and
one-half years thereafter when x-ray films revealed to her
for the first time the presence of the said broken roots.
Bowers v. Olch, 120 CA 2d 108, 260 P2d 997, was a
malpractice action, commenced within a year after plaintiff
discovered that a needle was left in his abdomen after a
surgical operntion on him in a hospital. ~he court held
the action was not barred by the Statute of Limitations as
to hospital's resident surgeon participating in operation.
which was performed over one year before the commencement of the action, because the Statute of Limitations did
not commernce to run as to such surgeon until the plaintiff
discoveTed that the needle was left in his body.
In Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 389 P3d 224.
86 Idaho 485, it was determined that a patient's cause of
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action for malpractice arising out of the fact that a surgeon left a gauze sponge in the patient when performing an
operation in 1948 was not barred by the Statute of Limitations although the suit was not brought until 1962, when
the presence of the sponge was discorvered after an explora w1·y operation was performed in 1961.
It is interesting to note at this time, the most recent
case concerning this area of the law, especially since it is
from the sister State of Montana. This case overrules a
long standing µrecedent and interprets a statute almost
identical to our statute. The court held the statute begins
to run upon discovery of the injury, not upon commission
of the tort. A synopsis of the case is reported in the
American Trial Lawyers Association Newsletter, Vol. 9,
No. 7, page 222, dated September, 1966. Because the editor of the Newsletter put the reasoning so eloquently, Appellant quotes the article from the aibove cited Newsletter.
The case is Johnson v. St. Patrick's Hospital, 417 P2d
169 Mont. (Decided August 8, 1966).
"One of the most gnarly problems in the intractable
area of medical malpractice is when the statute of limitations begins to run in cases of undiscovered malpractice, such as those in which the surgeon sews up a
foreign object inside the surgical wound. How shoud
the law handle the problem of the forgotten s1xmge,
Kelly damp, hemostat, or other examples of miscellaneous misplaced surgical hardware? The "foreignobject" cases are classic examples of inherently unknowable harms, and to apply the strict general rule
that the statute of limitations starts to run from the
date of the malpractice (closing of incision) and not
the date of its diligent discovery, harshly insisting that
blameless ignorance of the injury does not prevent the
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cause of action from accruing and the statute from
running would seem to be gross unfairness and a wen
0!1 the fair face of justice.
The modern trend is to avoid this harsh rule and to
allow the malpractice victim to bring an action at any
time ·within the statutory period following discovery
of defendant's malpractice. See, e.g., Johnson v. CaJdwell, 123 N.W.2d 785 (Mich. 1963)
("S~mply and
clearly stated the discovery rule is: The limitation
statute or statutes in malpractice cases do not start to
run until the date of discovery, or the date wlvn. bY
the exercise of reasonable care, plaintiff should haw
discovered the wrongful act
We an: p:'rsuacled we should adopt the rationale of the discovery
doctrine"), Ayers v. Morgan, 154 A.2d 788 (Pa. 195cJI,
25 NACCA L.J. 131-38 (statute began to run not wh?n
surgeon left sponge in plaintiff's abdomen during an
operation, but when patient discovered presence of
sponge. almost 9 years later); Fernandi v. Strully, lTl
A.2d 277 (N ..T. 1961) (surgeon left wing nut from instrument used in hysterectomy in patient's body: "Justice cries out that she fairly be afforded a day in
court"); 80 ALR2d 368; Louisell & Williams, Trial of
Medical Malpractice Cases, ss 13.06-13.12.
Rejecting the cross-grained date-of-malpractice rule,
the Supreme Court of Montana has just commend-ably
held that its 3-year malpractice statute of limitations
started to run from the date the patient discovered or
should have discovered that a surgical sponge had be?n
left in his body by hospital employees, and 22£! from
the date of the negligent act.
In reaching this equitable result, the court overruled
a prior inconsistent 94-year-old unjust precedent, thereby demonstrating that in Torts, no rule is settled until
it is settled right. Error does not become invulnerable
with age."
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Other authorities:
Rosane v. Singer, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P2d 372.
Morrison v. Acton, 68 Ariz. 27, 198 P2d 590.
Stafford v. Schultz, 259 P2d 494 superceded 42 Cal. 2d
767, 270 P2d 1.
Myers v. Stevenson, 125 CA 2d 399, 270 P2d 885.
Hurlimann v. Bank of America, 141 C.A. 2d 801, 297
P2d 682.
In the western states, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana and California support the California rule.

New Mex-

ico, Washington and Oregon are the only western states

that have ruled on the subject, that do not support the California rule.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant respectfully urges the Court to set aside
the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the
lower court for trial on the merits.

The Appellant respect-

fully contends, (1) that the basic trend in the law today is
toward the more liberal rule, to-wit: the limitation statute
or statutes in malpractice cases do not start to run until
the date of discovery, or the date when, by reasonable care,
plaintiff should have discovered the wrongful act, and (2),
that the peculiar facts of this case present a problem not
Yt't considered by the Utah Court.

In view of the above

ilnd the recent decisions of the Sister States, Appellant

re-
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spectfully submits that it would be appropriate for Utah
to join California, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, and Montana,
and allow the Plaintiff to present his case to the jury.
Respectfully submitted,
JACKSON B. HOWARD, for
HOW ARD AND LEWIS
Attorneys for Appellant
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah
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